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Note
Setting Sail with The Charming Betsy: Enforcing
the International Court of Justice's Avena
Judgment in Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings
LauraA. Young*
On March 31, 2004, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, ordered U.S. courts to review and reconsider the convictions and
death sentences of fifty-one Mexican nationals on death row in
nine states.1 The ICJ found that by failing to inform foreign defendants of their right to contact their consulate, the United
States had breached its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), a treaty by which the
United States has been bound since 1969.2 Over the past decade, state and federal courts, following the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court, have been reluctant to review the merits of VCCR
* J.D. Candidate 2005, University of Minnesota Law School; M.P.H.
Emory University; B.A. University of Virginia. My thanks to Sandra Babcock
for her invaluable assistance with this Note and to Jos6 Medellin and Edgar
Tamayo for reminding me never to give up. Ryan Stai and Hema Viswanathan
provided much appreciated editorial work and encouragement. Finally, thanks
to Jerald and Carolyn Young, and to Brian Southwell, for everything.
1. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128
(Mar. 31).
2. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T.
77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, (entered into force Mar. 19, 1967). At the United Nations
Conference on Consular Relations in 1963, the Vienna Convention was
adopted to codify consular rights and obligations among nations around the
globe. More than ninety-two national governments participated in the conference. LUKE T. LEE, VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS 17 (1966).
The VCCR was ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1969 and is a self-executing
treaty, meaning that it does not require separate implementing legislation to
become effective as domestic law. U.S. Dep't of State, Consular Notification
and Access, Part 5: Legal Material, at http://travel.state.govflaw/consular/
consular_744.html#vienna (last visited Jan. 10, 2005) ("[o]bligations of consular notification and access are not codified in any federal statute. Implementing legislation is not necessary (and the VCCR ... [is] thus 'self-executing')
because executive, law enforcement, and judicial authorities can implement
these obligations through their existing powers").
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claims or to fashion a remedy for acknowledged treaty violations. Instead, courts have often chosen to dismiss claims on
procedural grounds, without a full hearing. The question now
confronting courts across the country is whether the new ICJ
directive in Avena will force change or lead to further entrenchment. The Supreme Court will take up this issue in
March 2005 when it hears arguments in the case of Jos6
Medellin. Given the executive and judicial branches' past reluctance to defer to international law norms where the death penalty is concerned, 3 the ICJ appears to have "set itself on a colli4
sion course with American courts."
This Note argues for the use of the longstanding Charming
Betsy canon of statutory construction to avert the potential collision between the ICJ and domestic doctrines, specifically the

3. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (responding to the argument that the VCCR should trump domestic procedural doctrines, the Court
stated, "[tihis argument is plainly incorrect"); Brief for Amicus Curiae United
States, Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-2770) (arguing
that the ICJ's provisional order asking for a stay of execution should not be
accorded comity). But see Harold Hongju Koh, InternationalLaw as Part of
Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 46 (2004) (describing that, related to its Eighth
Amendment "evolving standards of decency" analysis, the Supreme Court has
been willing to defer to international legal norms).
The United States remains an international outlier in its use of the death
penalty. The death penalty has been virtually eliminated across Europe, and
neither Mexico nor Canada sanctions death as an acceptable punishment.
RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 685-86 (1994) (listing nations that have abolished, and that still retain, the death penalty). The United States' retention of the death penalty has
concerned the European community in particular, and has raised the stakes
related to extradition treaties and similar agreements that deal with foreign
nationals who are subject to criminal proceedings in the United States. See
generally William A. Schabas, Indirect Abolition: CapitalPunishment's Role in
ExtraditionLaw and Practice,25 LOYOLA INT'L COMP. L. REV. 581 (2003).
Aside from extradition issues, the Council of Europe has threatened to revoke the United States' observer member status as a result of its refusal to enter into a dialogue on ending execution as a means of punishment. Council
Resolution 1253, Abolition of The Death Penalty in Council of Europe Observer States, adopted June 25, 2001, at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/
AdoptedText/TAO1/ERES1253.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2005). In June of
2001, the Council adopted a resolution based on a report from its Human
Rights Panel noting that the United States and Japan are in violation of their
obligations under a council resolution pertaining to observer member states.
Id. The resolution stated that the use of execution as punishment is in violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and that "the
death penalty has no legitimate place in the penal systems of modern civilised
societies." Id.
4. Adam Liptak, A Court Decision Is One Thing; Enforcing It Is Another,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2004, at A8.
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Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)5 and
procedural default. 6 Under Charming Betsy, federal statutes
should be construed so as to avoid violations of international
law.7 This Note also argues that if statutes, which represent
the will of Congress, should be interpreted consistently with international law, then the judge-made doctrine of procedural default should be subject to a similar interpretation. Applying
Charming Betsy would allow domestic courts to deal with the
ICJ directive on their own terms 8 -an important consideration
given prevailing dualist notions of international law9-and
would assure foreign treaty partners that the United States
recognizes its international obligations. 10
5. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28
U.S.C.). The AEDPA imposes strict procedural limits on federal jurisdiction
over habeas appeals. See Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death,
77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 729-31 (2002).
6. See generally Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). Simply stated,
a "defendant whose lawyer fails to raise a claim at the time or in a manner required by state procedures may lose the chance to have that claim heard."
John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural
Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 681 (1990).
7. In Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804), the Court stated that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains."
8. See Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the
Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 675, 742 (2003) (noting that the

Charming Betsy canon "provides an extremely important mechanism for indirect recognition of international tribunal decisions").
9. See infra Part II.
10. Several writers have suggested potential solutions to the VCCR compliance problem, though few have addressed the needs of capital defendants
currently involved in collateral appeal proceedings. See, e.g., Joshua A. Brook,
Federalism and Foreign Affairs: How to Remedy Violations of the Vienna Convention and Obey the U.S. Constitution, Too, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 573,
591-98 (2004) (arguing that congressional legislation will likely be the most
effective means of enhancing compliance); Linda E. Carter, Compliance with
ICJ Provisional Measures and the Meaning of Review and Reconsideration
Under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 117,
128-33 (2003) (agreeing with the argument made by Mexico in Avena that
clemency cannot constitute sufficient review and reconsideration); Cara Drinan, Note, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular-Relations:Private
Enforcement in American Courts After LaGrand, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1303, 1311
(2002) (suggesting that individuals denied VCCR rights could sue for damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to encourage state compliance with the VCCR); Note,
Too Sovereign but Not Sovereign Enough: Are U.S. States Beyond the Reach of
the Law of Nations?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2654, 2671-77 (2003) (hypothesizing
that three options are available for forcing states to comply with the VCCR,
including executive orders staying executions where the VCCR was violated,
suits by the federal government against states to force compliance, and
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Part I of this Note describes
the legal landscape related
VCCR violations and the
to
death penalty, including
both ICJ and
Supreme Court rulings on
the issue, and outlines the
brewing
conflict between the review
and reconsideration ordered
by the
ICJ and domestic doctrines.
Part II
firmly dualist in their understandingargues that U.S. courts are
of how international law
interacts with domestic
law-at least when it comes
to the
death penalty-and as a
result, international tribunal
directives must be enforced under
the guise of domestic legal
doctrine. Part III describes
the Charming Betsy canon
and discusses how it might be applied
to the AEDPA so as to allow
the
ICJ's requirement of review
and reconsideration to be
mented in federal habeas
implecorpus
addresses the fact that Charmingproceedings. Part IV briefly
Betsy's logic should also
ply to prevent courts from
apdenying review and reconsideration
through use of procedural
default rules.

H ABEA S COR

I. MEXICO V. UNITED STATES:
SEEKING A REMEDY FOR
TREATY VIOLATIONS

IN DEATH PENALTY CASES
Three nations have brought
cases before the ICJ11 in
an attempt to bring the United
States into compliance
with the
VCCR and to demand a
remedy for past violations-Paraguay
in 1998,12 Germany in
2001,13 and most recently,
Mexico
2003.14 The key issue in
each case has been interpretation in
of
Article 36 of the VCCR, which
reads in relevant part:
1.
(b) if he so requests, the competent
authorities of the receiving
State shall, without delay,
inform the consular post of
the sending
State if, within its consular
district, a national of that
rested or committed to prison
State is aror to custody pending trial
or is de-

changes in the Court's Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence
to allow states to
be sued by foreign governments
in federal court).
11. The ICJ has jurisdiction
signed by both the United States under an optional protocol to the VCCR,
enna Convention on Consular and Mexico. See Optional Protocol to the ViRelations Concerning the
ment of Disputes, Apr. 24,
Compulsory Settle1963, art. 1, 21 U.S.T. 325,
596 U.N.T.S. 487, 488.
The Optional Protocol states
interpretation or application in relevant part that "[d]isputes arising out of the
of the Convention shall lie within
jurisdiction of the International
the compulsory
Court of Justice and
brought before the Court by
an application made by any may accordingly be
party to the dispute
being a Party to the present
Protocol."
12. Concerning the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations
(Para. v.
U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9).
13. LaGrand Case (F.R.G.
v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June
14. Avena and other Mexican
27).
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004
I.C.J. 128
(Mar. 31).
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tained in any other manner.... The said authorities shall inform the
person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph;
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving
State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the
rights accorded under this Article are intended. 15

In short, this language requires that when a foreign national is
detained by state or federal authorities in the United States,
those authorities must notify the detainee of the right to contact his consulate and must notify the consulate that one of its
16
nationals has been detained.
Each of the three nations that have brought claims before
the ICJ argued that the United States failed to notify their nationals of their rights to consular communication, 17 and thus
impeded the foreign government's ability to provide assistance
and, ultimately, to prevent their nationals from being sentenced to death.' 8 While the United States in the past has offered diplomatic apologies as a remedy after foreign nationals
were executed in violation of Article 36, the ICJ ruled in LaGrand, a case brought by Germany, that an apology was insufficient. 19 The question of what remedy is required after a VCCR
violation was contested again when Mexico brought its case to
the ICJ.20

15. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, 21
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 293-94.
16. The exact interpretation of the language of Article 36 has been the
subject of extensive litigation, and a description of the ICJ's rulings on the
meaning of disputed terms, such as "without delay," for example, is beyond the
scope of this Note.
17. Article 5 of the VCCR describes consular functions as "protecting in
the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals, both
individuals and bodies corporate," furthering relations, issuing travel documents, and providing general assistance of all kinds. Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 5, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 268.
A list of U.S. embassies and consular posts can be found at http://travel.state
.gov/travel/tips/embassies/embassies1214.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2005). A
list of Mexican consulates in North America can be found at http://www.mex
online.comlconsulate.htm (lastvisited July 1, 2004).
18. E.g., Memorial of Mexico 38 (June 20, 2003), Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31).
19. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 512 (June 27).
20. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128
(Mar. 31).
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A. MEXICO'S ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE ICJ
In December 2003, representatives of the Mexican government told the ICJ that the United States was a chronic treaty
violator and that it owed Mexico a remedy. The violations Mexico brought before the ICJ related to fifty-one Mexican nationals, all of whom had been arrested, tried, and convicted of capital crimes in the United States, but who had not been notified
of their VCCR rights. 21 Mexico argued first that consular notification is vital for Mexicans in the United States who often do
not speak English and who are unfamiliar with the U.S. criminal justice system. 22 When Mexican nationals are able to communicate with their consulate, consular officers can provide invaluable assistance in procuring or monitoring counsel,
explaining the concept of plea bargaining, and gathering vital
evidence and witnesses from Mexico to participate in the sentencing phases of death penalty trials.23 This failure to notify,
Mexico argued, constitutes a violation of Article 36(1) of the
2
VCCR. 4
Mexico also argued that because the United States failed to
notify defendants of their VCCR rights, the violation of those
rights was never raised in judicial proceedings at the state
level. 25 As a result, under judicially created procedural default
doctrines and the AEDPA, 26 courts refuse to review the merits
of VCCR claims in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Mexico
argued that the application of those rules was in itself a separate violation of Article 36(2) of the VCCR, because the rules
barred courts from attaching any legal significance to the
27
treaty violation.
Finally, as a remedy for these violations, Mexico demanded
that the convictions and sentences of all fifty-one Mexican na21. See Memorial of Mexico 7 89-92 (June 20, 2003), Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31).
22. Id. 79 49-71. This is particularly true for Mexican nationals because
the government of Mexico has created an official program, the Mexican Capital Legal Defense Program, to provide assistance to its nationals who are
36.
charged with capital crimes. Id.
23. Id. It 72-88.
169.
24. Id.
25. Id. IT 226-29.
26. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.
and 28 U.S.C.).
27. Memorial of Mexico 9 226-27 (June 20, 2003), Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31).
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tionals be vacated, or at a minimum, that courts be prevented
from applying procedural default rules so as to avoid hearing
28
VCCR claims on appeal.
B. THE UNITED STATES' RESPONSE TO MEXICO'S CLAIMS
The United States denied breaches of the VCCR in all of
the cases. 29 It argued that many of the individuals listed in
Mexico's memorial actually were U.S. citizens or presented
"strong indicia" of citizenship, and noted that many had confessed prior to being officially detained, thus never triggering
30
VCCR protection.
The United States went on to argue that had any breaches
of Article 36(1) in fact taken place, those cases were subject to
"review and reconsideration" in conformity with domestic law
and with the ICJ's prior decision in LaGrand.31 The LaGrand
case was a suit by Germany over the same issue where the ICJ
had ruled that the appropriate remedy for an Article 36 violation was "review and reconsideration" of the conviction and
sentence. 32 The United States was to implement the review and
reconsideration via means of its own choosing. 33 Referring to
LaGrand,the United States argued that it already provided review and reconsideration through its domestic appeals process
and that any defendant who could not raise the VCCR issue
due to procedural restrictions would receive sufficient review
34
and reconsideration through the executive clemency process.
C. THE ICJ FINDS THE UNITED STATES IN BREACH AND
CLARIFIES APPROPRIATE REMEDIES

After hearing oral arguments in the case, the ICJ issued a
ruling that attempted to find middle ground on this divisive is-

28.

Id.

357-406. Mexico also argued that evidence or statements ob-

tained prior to notification be excluded from any new trial and that the United
States offer Mexico guarantees that treaty violations would not be repeated.
Id.
374, 398.
29. Counter-Memorial of the United States
1.6 (Nov. 3, 2003), Avena
and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31).
30. Id. 1.2.
31. Id. 1.9.
32. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 513-14 (June 27).
33. Id. at 514.
34. Counter-Memorial of the United States
1.16, 9.4 (Nov. 3, 2003),
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31).
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sue. 35 Though contested, there was never any real question that

the United States was in breach of its VCCR obligations. The
ICJ found Article 36(1) violations in all fifty-one cases and
again held that review and reconsideration was the appropriate
remedy for failure to notify defendants of their rights under the
VCCR.36 The ICJ clarified that the "review and reconsideration" it had envisioned in LaGrand "should occur within the
overall judicial proceedings relating to the individual defendant
concerned"3 7 and that "the clemency process, as currently practiced within the United States criminal justice system ... is...

not sufficient in itself to serve as an appropriate means of 'review and reconsideration."' 38 In addition, the ICJ found Article
36(2) violations in three cases where defendants had exhausted
state and federal appeals and had been procedurally barred at
39
all stages from raising the VCCR issue.
With the ICJ's ruling, a flurry of activity began in domestic
courts. Of the cases where the ICJ has found treaty violations,
one of the most urgent is that of Jos6 Ernesto Medellin Rojas.
Medellin, along with five other youths from Houston, was convicted in 1994 for the gang rape and murder of two teenage
girls. 40 The Fifth Circuit recently denied his request for a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether state authorities' failure to notify him of his right to consular contact prejudiced his case and the U.S. Supreme Court has granted
certiorari. 4 1 For Medellin and other Mexican nationals in federal court, the next step is asking for the review and reconsideration required by Avena. Aside from implicating a vastly
complicated array of statutes and case law relating to the death
penalty, the cases of Mexican nationals named in the Avena
judgment implicate the often tortured and constantly evolving
interplay between international law and the U.S. legal system.

42

35. See generally Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004
I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31).
106, 121.
36. Id.
37. Id. 141.
38. Id. 143.
113-14.
39. Id.
40. Medellin v. State, No. 71,997, slip. op. at 1-3 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar.
19, 1997).
41. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted,
2004 WL 2075039 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-5928).
42. As one scholar puts it, "international law and U.S. Constitutional law
seem to exhibit a kind of passive hostility toward one another." Edward T.
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II. ENFORCING DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNALS IN DOMESTIC COURTS: DUALIST AND
MONIST PERSPECTIVES
Litigation over the VCCR, like legal battles over detainees
in Guantanamo, 43 and the outcry over White House memoranda authorizing potentially illegal interrogation practices, 44
has laid bare the vast gulf between competing theories about
how international law and domestic law should interact in the
context of a particular nation-state. International law is a
broad term that encompasses, among other things, norms of
state practice, broadly focused multilateral human rights
agreements, narrowly focused bilateral treaties, as well as decisions of an increasingly wide array of international tribunals.
In asking for enforcement of the Avena judgment, the question
is one of interpreting and enforcing the decision of an international tribunal that itself interprets a multilateral, yet relatively narrowly focused treaty designed to codify norms of state
consular practices developed over centuries.
Two main theories related to the enforcement of international law in domestic courts, the monist and dualist perspectives, have long been a subject of debate among scholars. 45 Monist theory draws on natural law rationales and proposes that
international and domestic law are interlocked in a single system, leading to the notion that international legal norms dominate domestic law when there is conflict. 46 Alternatively, most
domestic legal institutions draw on dualist theory when evaluating their own relationship to international law. 47 Dualist the-

ory sees domestic and international law as distinct, with mu-

Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
403, 449 (2003).
43. E.g., Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).

44.

E.g., R. Jeffrey Smith, Slim Legal Grounds for Torture Memos, WASH.

POST, July 4, 2004, at A12.

45. See Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the InternationalistConception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 530 (1999) (stating that there
are "two basic viewpoints concerning the relationship between international
and domestic law--'monism' and 'dualism'"); Koh, supra note 3, at 52-57 (describing evidence of the dueling "nationalist," or dualist, and "transnationalist," or monist, perspectives held by current members of the Supreme Court);
see also R. C. HINGORANI, MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 29-30 (1984).
46.

See PETER MALANCZUK,

AKEHURST'S

INTERNATIONAL LAW 63 (7th ed.
INTERNATIONAL LAW 39-42 (1970).

47.

MODERN INTRODUCTION

1997); see also D.P. O'CONNELL,

See MALANCZUK, supra note 46, at 65.

TO
1
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nicipal law generally supreme in the face of conflict. 48 Scholars
note that courts in the United States, not to mention the executive branch, are dualist in their conception of international law,
especially with regard to the death penalty. 49
A discussion of the first case to raise the VCCR issue in the
context of the death penalty helps to illustrate this point. Angel
Breard, a Paraguayan national, was convicted of attempted
rape and murder in Virginia in 1993. His sentence was confirmed by the state supreme court in 1994. 50 Although state authorities were aware of his status as a foreign national, Breard
was never informed of his right to contact the Paraguayan consulate. 51 As a result, Breard did not raise the is3ue of his VCCR
rights until his 1996 federal habeas corpus appeal. 52 The
Fourth Circuit held that Breard's VCCR claim was procedurally defaulted because he had not appropriately raised it at
the state level. 53 By the time the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed
Breard's habeas petition, Paraguay had brought suit in the ICJ
and that court had issued provisional measures demanding
that the United States "take the measures necessary to ensure
that Mr. Breard is not executed pending the disposition of [his]
case." 54 The Supreme Court affirmed the lower federal courts in
a per curiam decision that was issued on Breard's execution
date. 55 Breard was executed despite the ICJ provisional measures and Paraguay subsequently dropped its suit. 56

48. See id. at 63-64; O'CONNELL, supra note 46, at 42.
49. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 45, at 531 (stating that "[m]ost commentators agree that, at least during the latter half of this century, dualism has
been the prevailing view"); Harold Hongju Koh, Paying Decent Respect to International Tribunal Rulings, 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 45, 46 (2002) (noting that "[wle have never had in the United States a monistic system in which
international tribunals sit in some form of binding vertical appellate review of
domestic adjudication"). But see JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 99-118 (2d ed. 2003) (describing a more monist
jurisprudence as evidenced in recommended changes to the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 115).
50. Breard v. Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1994), aff'd sub nom.
Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998).
51. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 373 (1998) (per curiam).
52. Id.
53. See Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 618-20 (4th Cir. 1998); Breard v.
Netherland, 949 F. Supp. 1255, 1262-63 (E.D. Va. 1996) (mem.). •
54. Order (Apr. 9, 1998), Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248, 251 (Apr. 9).
55. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376.
56. Order (Nov. 10, 1998), Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 426 (Apr. 9).

900

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[89:890

While Paraguay's suit before the ICJ did not produce a final ruling from that court, Breard's case did produce bad
precedent for defendants in domestic courts. The Supreme
Court's opinion in Breard denied relief on two grounds: procedural rules of a forum nation-state govern implementation of
treaties in that nation-state, 5 7 and the last-in-time rule controls, if a statute and a treaty are in conflict. 58 The ruling was
dualist in that it showed a preference for domestic doctrine,
even judge-made procedural doctrine, over treaty obligations
that had been freely and voluntarily assumed by the United
States under the Vienna Convention. 59 Breard continues to
prevent defendants from obtaining review and reconsideration
of VCCR claims. For example, in the case of Medellin, the Fifth
Circuit stated, "only the Supreme Court may overrule a Supreme Court decision. The Supreme Court has not overruled
Breard. We are bound to follow the precedent until taught oth60
erwise by the Supreme Court."
Analyzing Breard as an affirmation of dualist thinking
trickling down through the judiciary helps in understanding
the utter failure of federal courts to provide relief to a single defendant on the basis of VCCR violations. 6 1 Under a dualist con57. Breard,523 U.S. at 375. It is important to note, however, that a similarly long-standing principle of international law holds that states may not
invoke their domestic legislation or procedures as an excuse for failing to comply with international obligations. MALANCZUK, supra note 46, at 64; see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 115 cmt. b (1986) (specifying that a "state cannot adduce its constitu-

tion or its laws as a defense for failure to carry out its international obligation").
58. Breard,523 U.S. at 376.
59. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and
Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of InternationalLaw,
86 GEO. L.J. 479 (1998).
60. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2004).
61. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, 223 F. Supp. 2d 968, 980 n.13
(N.D. Ill. 2002) (granting relief on Sixth Amendment grounds but noting that
"it is unlikely that this, or any other Court could premise relief on [a Vienna
Convention violation]"); see also Amanda E. Burks, Consular Assistance for
Foreign Defendants: Avoiding Default and Fortifyinga Defense, 14 CAP. DEF.
J. 29, 40 (2001). It is encouraging, however, that since Avena, one state court
has granted review and reconsideration based on a VCCR violation. The first
defendant to bring the Avena judgment back to the United States was Osbaldo
Torres, whose execution was to take place just a few weeks after the ICJ's
judgment was issued. Torres v. Oklahoma, No. D-1996-350 (Okla. Crim. App.
Mar. 1, 2004) (order setting execution date). Torres had exhausted his state
and federal appeals and brought a new petition in state court asking the court
to order an evidentiary hearing on his Article 36 claim. Torres v. Mullin, 317
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ception, decisions of international tribunals such as the ICJ
have little force in domestic legal decision making until they
have been incorporated into domestic law through statutory directives or Supreme Court precedent. 62 As a result, federal
courts continue to follow Breard in declining to review the mer63
its of VCCR claims brought by foreign nationals.
With its Avena ruling, the ICJ specified that by "review
and reconsideration," it meant a judicial hearing in which a
court would consider whether the treaty violation-the failure
by arresting authorities to notify either the foreign national or
the consulate-prejudiced the defendant's case such that a new

F.3d 1145, cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 562 (2003) (mem.). Torres argued that the
Oklahoma courts were bound by the judgment of the ICJ under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 124 S. Ct. 562, 563. The Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals ultimately agreed and granted Torres a hearing, allowing
for the review and reconsideration required by LaGrand and Avena. Torres v.
State, No. PCD-04-442, slip op. at 1 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004). In a special concurrence, Judge Chapel summarized the logic of the Supremacy Clause
argument:
At its simplest, this is a matter of contract. A treaty is a contract
between sovereigns. The notion that contracts must be enforceable
against those who enter into them is fundamental to the Rule of Law.
This case is resolved by this very basic idea. The United States voluntarily and legally entered into a treaty, a contract with over 100 other
countries. The United States is bound by the terms of the treaty and
the State of Oklahoma is obligated by virtue of the Supremacy Clause
to give effect to that treaty.
As this Court is bound by the treaty itself, we are bound to give
full faith and credit to the Avena decision. I am not suggesting that
the International Court of Justice has jurisdiction over this Courtfar from it. However, in these unusual circumstances the issue of
whether this Court must abide by that court's opinion in Torres's case
is not ours to determine. The United States Senate and the President
have made that decision for us.
Id. at 5 (Chapel, J., concurring). The Governor of Oklahoma subsequently
commuted Torres' sentence to life imprisonment. See Adam Liptak, Execution
of Mexican Is Halted, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2004, at A23. While the Supremacy
Clause argument has intricacies of its own, the focus of this Note is on the larger group of defendants who had not exhausted their appeals when Avena was
issued and who are moving through the habeas corpus process. These defendants are not likely to win a Supremacy Clause argument because treaties do
not automatically trump federal statutes, as they do state law, under the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp.
1456, 1464 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting that "[u]nder our constitutional system,
statutes and treaties are both the supreme law of the land, and the Constitution sets forth no order of precedence to differentiate between them.")
62. See HINGORANI, supra note 45, at 30; O'CONNELL, supra note 46, at
42.
63. E.g., Valdez v. State, 46 P.3d 703, 709-10 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002)
(denying relief based on a VCCR claim raised after LaGrand).
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trial or sentencing is required. 64 In short, compliance with
Avena requires an evidentiary hearing-exactly what the Supreme Court refused to give Angel Breard when he raised the
violation of the VCCR in his 1998 case.
A brief explanation of the process by which capital cases
make their way through the courts is helpful at this point, to
introduce the doctrines considered in this Note. Capital defendants in the United States go through a three-stage appeals
process after a finding of guilt and a death sentence in the state
trial court: direct appeal, state postconviction review, and federal habeas corpus review. 65 Depending on a defendant's progression through this process, the obstacles to his request for
review and reconsideration will be different. Defendants bringing claims in state postconviction proceedings may have the
simplest path to enforcement under the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution. 66 Defendants bringing claims in federal habeas corpus proceedings, however, face a considerably more
convoluted route, because of the tangled web of statutory and
67
judicially created restrictions on the writ of habeas corpus.
Within the federal habeas corpus process, capital defendants may be in variously beneficial or disastrous positions,
based on the relative knowledge and procedural expertise of
their previous attorney, or, in most cases, attorneys. As in
Breard, two main restraints will almost certainly rear their
heads in the cases of defendants asking for review and reconsideration under Avena: judge-made procedural bars, and the
AEDPA restrictions on evidentiary hearings.
Procedural default is a judicially created doctrine that allows federal courts to refuse to review potentially meritorious
claims if those claims were not raised in state court in accordance with state procedural rules.68 Procedural default in effect
prevents appellants from even getting into the courthouse. One
can imagine the problem this can cause for foreign national defendants who are not notified of their rights under the VCCR.
64.
65.
66.

See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
See generally COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 3.
See supra note 61 for a discussion of the Torres case.

67. See generally RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, 2 FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 22 (2001).

68. See Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). For the procedural bar
rule to apply, a petitioner must violate an applicable state procedural rule, the
state court must rely on this adequate and independent state ground to deny
relief, and the state must timely raise procedural bar as a defense to the petitioner's claim for relief. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 67, § 26.1.
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Those defendants never raise their rights in state court because
they know nothing of them. They are then barred from raising
a claim based on that right in federal court because they failed
to comply with state procedures that required them to raise a
denial of a federal right at trial.
If a defendant can overcome procedural default, he must
demand an evidentiary hearing to prove the facts that could not
be introduced in state postconviction proceedings because of the
procedural default rule. It is here that the AEDPA statutory
restrictions may operate to prevent the review and reconsideration required by Avena.
Breard, for example, did not raise his Vienna Convention
claim until he reached the federal habeas corpus appeals process. 69 As a result, the Supreme Court held that Breard was subject to both procedural default and to a provision of the AEDPA
that prohibits defendants from raising claims in federal court
when they have failed to develop the factual basis of the claims
in state court. 70 The relevant statutory language from the
AEDPA reads:
(a) [The courts] shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas
corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court only on the grounds that he is in custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States....
(e)(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim
in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary
hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that(A) the claim relies on(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered
through the exercise of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no
reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant guilty of the
71
underlying offense.

Although defendants in Breard's position should become
less and less common as information about the Vienna Convention becomes more widely available, there will remain some defendants who are never notified of their rights to consular noti69. Breard,523 U.S. at 373.
70. Id. at 376.
71. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
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fication, and whose attorneys fail to raise the issue because of
lack of knowledge. These individuals will find themselves in
federal court attempting to enforce the ICJ's demand for review
and reconsideration, but their claim will be barred by both the
procedural default rule and the AEDPA restrictions on eviden72
tiary hearings.
Without full briefing or oral argument on the subject, the
Court in Breard assumed a direct conflict between U.S. obligations under the VCCR and the domestic doctrines. 73 This perceived conflict immediately raised the Court's dualist hackles,
of the last-in-time rule to trump
and led to the invocation
74
treaty obligations.
III. DEMANDING REVIEW AND RECONSIDERATION
THROUGH THE CHARMING BETSY CANON
The last-in-time rule applies when there is direct conflict
between a statute and a treaty, or between two statutes. 75 If a
72. For example, Jos6 Medellin raised his Vienna Convention claim in
state habeas corpus proceedings, but no hearing was ever held on the matter.
See Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 279-80 (5th Cir. 2004). Though the facts
were never "developed" in state court, it is possible that a court would find
that the AEDPA's restriction on evidentiary hearings does not apply in
Medellin's case. He did in fact raise the claim in state court, but the procedural bar doctrine prevented him from developing the facts. The standard for
application of AEDPA § 2254(e) was established by the Supreme Court in
2000. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431-32 (2000). In Williams, the petitioner raised a new claim of juror and prosecutorial misconduct, but the factual basis of the claim was not reasonably available to defense counsel at the
time of trial. In such cases, the failure is not the petitioner's fault, so courts do
not apply the § 2254(e) bar on evidentiary hearings. The Supreme Court has
not definitively ruled on whether procedurally defaulted claims, even when
initially raised in state habeas proceedings, are "failures" under § 2254(e).
Even if § 2254(e) is held not to apply in Medellin's case, the procedural default
doctrine undoubtedly does apply. See Dretke, 371 F.3d at 279-80.
73. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376 (viewing the AEDPA and the VCCR as "inconsistent").
74. "When a statute that is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a
treaty, the statute to the extent of the conflict renders the treaty null." Id.
(quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957)).
75. In Whitney v. Robertson, the Supreme Court held that treaties and
statutes are on the same footing:
[B]oth are declared by [the constitution] to be the supreme law of the
land. When the two relate to the same subject, the courts will always
endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be
done without violating the language of either; but if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other: provided, always, the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing.
124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888). The Whitney Court also makes clear that the legisla-
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court can be convinced, however, that the conflict consists simply of differing interpretations of a statute, as opposed to a direct conflict based on a single interpretation, another canon of
construction comes into play.
A. THE CHARMING BETSY CANON OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION
When Breard was decided, international law scholars disputing the ruling suggested that the Supreme Court should
have applied the CharmingBetsy canon.7 6 The CharmingBetsy
canon takes its name from a schooner that was the subject of a
seizure dispute. 77 The United States Navy had seized The
Charming Betsy under the auspices of the Nonintercourse Act
of 1800, which prohibited "any person or persons, resident
within the United States or under their protection" from trading with French nationals. 78 The owner of The Charming Betsy
sued, claiming that he was a Danish citizen, though he had
been born in the United States. The Court held that the Nonintercourse Act did not apply to The CharmingBetsy's owner, because to construe the statute to have such far-reaching effect
would violate the law of nations. 79 Specifically, the Court
stated, "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains."80
While the canon may have had its genesis in a fledgling
nation's desire to avoid disputes with more powerful foreign nations, 8 ' the Charming Betsy doctrine has recently been detive branch is responsible for abrogating treaties. Id.
76. E.g., Jordan J. Paust, Breard and Treaty-Based Rights Under the Consular Convention, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 691, 692 (1998). While proposing that the
CharmingBetsy canon should apply, Professor Paust did not fully develop the
application of the canon in his brief article. Paust stated that "application of
both the procedural 'default' doctrine and the subsequent statute to defeat
treaty-based rights of the individual was inappropriate. In view of The Charming Betsy rule, the procedural doctrine should be interpreted consistently with
international law." Id. (citation omitted). This Note attempts to take Paust's
suggestion further, exploring in depth how a court might use the Charming
Betsy canon to reconcile the AEDPA and Avena, while also responding to
scholarly work that argues for a very narrow application of the canon.
77. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 66 (1804).
78. Id. at 118.
79. Id. at 120-21.
80. Id. at 118.
81. Bradley, supra note 59, at 492 (noting that the early "U.S. government
had a strong desire to avoid violations of international law, largely due to a
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scribed as one of several models on a continuum of approaches
that domestic courts can use to grant deference to international
82
law decisions.
Under this approach, there are no binding instructions in a statute or
treaty as to what effect to give to the international tribunal decision.
Nor is the court even requested to directly recognize and enforce the
decision. Rather, the decision is considered as8 3part of the process of
interpreting and construing a domestic statute.

Under this view, the Charming Betsy canon becomes particularly relevant for the enforcement of the Avena judgment in the
context of the AEDPA.
B. CHARMING BETSY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
Scholars argue that today, the Charming Betsy canon is essentially a tool to avoid separation of powers problems, in instances where judicial interpretation of statutes could place the
United States in violation of international law.8 4 While other
international legal scholars have disputed this narrow interpretation of the canon,8 5 this view of the Charming Betsy doctrine seems reasonable, in light of the dualist leanings of today's Supreme Court.
Whereas the conduct of the nation's foreign affairs is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative
branches, not the judiciary,8 6 separation of powers problems
can emerge when courts attempt to determine how statutes and
other doctrines impact the United States' international obligations. In other words, Congress is free to breach treaty obligations but judges are not.
The Court has long understood this relationship, holding
repeatedly that Congress has the authority to breach treaty obligations through express action, just as any party to a contract
can breach their obligations and suffer the consequences.8 7 This

fear that a violation might embroil the United States in a military conflict").
82. Alford, supra note 8, at 731.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 733-34.
85. Ralph G. Steinhardt, Recovering the Charming Betsy Principle, 94 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 49, 49 (2000).

86. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (listing Congress's power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, to punish offenses against the law of nations,
and to declare war); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (giving the President and the Senate the power to make treaties).
87. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (holding that with regard to treaties, "Congress may modify [treaty] provisions, so far as [those
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principle has been most evident in the Court's federal Indian
law jurisprudence,8 8 but also applies in other contexts. For example, in Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint,8 9 the parties

argued whether the repeal of a statute rendered a portion of
the Warsaw Convention-an international air carriage treaty
that the United States had ratified-unenforceable in the
United States. 90 The Court held that there is a "firm and obviously sound canon of construction against finding implicit repeal of a treaty in ambiguous congressional action." 9 1 This holding rested on the decision in Cook v. United States, involving a
ship owner who contested a fee as a violation of a treaty between the United States and Britain. 92 The Court held that,
while Congress has the power to abrogate treaties, "[a] treaty
will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a
later statute, unless such purpose on the part of Congress has
93
been clearly expressed."
This judicial concern over clear expression of congressional
intent derives from a concern that without such expression the
Court overreaches in interpreting statutes so as to violate
treaty obligations. 9 4 Treaty abrogation is the domain of Congress, and, arguably, the executive. As noted by one proponent
of the separation of powers analysis of CharmingBetsy:
[the canon] is a means by which the courts can seek guidance from
the political branches concerning whether and, if so, how they intend
to violate the international legal obligations of the United States.
Second, the canon reduces the number of occasions in which the

provisions] bind the United States, or supersede them altogether").
88. E.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567 (1903) (holding that
Congress had the power to abrogate prior treaties by enacting statutes allotting tribal lands to individual members and allowing the remaining lands to
be sold). But cf. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404,
412-13 (1968) (holding that the federal act in question did not abrogate the
tribe's reserved hunting and fishing rights because there was no express
statement of intent to abrogate).
89. 466 U.S. 243 (1984).
90. Id. at 245.
91. Id. at 252; see also Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 512 (1947) (declaring
that "we will not readily assume that when Congress enacted [the legislation] ...it had a purpose to abrogate all such treaty clauses").

92. 288 U.S. 102, 109-10 (1933).
93. Id. at 120.
94. The judicial concern derives not from the idea that "international law
in any sense trumps the will of Congress, but because inter alia domestic
courts are not in the business of declaring the legislative branch in breach of
international law in the absence of some clear Congressional statement to that
effect." Steinhardt, supra note 85, at 49.
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courts, in their interpretation of federal enactments, place the United
States in violation of international law contrary to the wishes of the
political branches. 95

Debate remains as to the contexts in which Charming
Betsy applies, particularly with regard to the level of ambiguity
necessary to invoke application of the rule. 96 Nevertheless,
given its dualist leanings, 97 it is a safe assumption that the current Supreme Court will construe the canon relatively narrowly, if indeed it can be convinced to apply it in dealing with
the Avena judgment. The narrowest interpretation, embodied
by the quote above, assumes that the Charming Betsy canon
applies only when courts must interpret an ambiguous statute
to avoid separation of powers problems.
C. PRIOR APPLICATION OF CHARMING BETSYIN UNITED STATES
V. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
The Southern District of New York applied the Charming
Betsy canon to deal with a similarly controversial conflict between a treaty and a subsequently enacted federal statute. 98 In
the 1980s, the Department of Justice (DOJ) brought suit in federal court seeking an injunction to close down the Observer
Mission of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) at the
United Nations Headquarters. 99 The DOJ claimed that the
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987100 abrogated the United States' international obligation to allow the PLO to operate an office at
the United Nations Headquarters. 10 1 The court noted that the
DOJ's interpretation of the statute would require the court to
order a clear abrogation of the international obligations of the
United States.10 2 Refusing to follow the Government's interpre95. Bradley, supra note 59, at 525-26.
96. Id. at 491 (stating that while the level of ambiguity required in a statute before the canon can apply is unclear, the overall focus of the canon on
avoiding violations of international law is nevertheless clear).
97. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
98. United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 146472 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
99. Id. at 1460.
100. The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 prohibits the establishment or operation of PLO offices within the United States. Pub. L. No. 100-204, Title X,
§ 1003(3), 101 Stat. 1331.
101. PalestineLiberation Org., 695 F. Supp. at 1460.
102. The United Nations Headquarters were established in New York by
treaty in 1947. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the United
States of America Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, June
26, 1947, U.S.-U.N., 61 Stat. 756, 11 U.N.T.S. 11, 14. This agreement allows
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tation, the court held that "the text of the [Anti-Terrorism Act]
and its legislative history, fails to disclose any clear legislative
intent that Congress was directing the Attorney General, the
State Department, or this Court to act in contravention of the
Headquarters Agreement." 10 3 The court went on to note that
while Congress has the power to abrogate treaties, courts will
not interpret statutes to do so unless there is an "unequivocal"
expression of congressional intent to abrogate. 10 4 The court specifically referred to Charming Betsy to support its holding that
apply to the PLO
the newly enacted Anti-Terrorism Act did not
10 5
office at the United Nations Headquarters.
As the Supreme Court had done in Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy,10 6 more than one hundred years earlier, the
court in Palestine Liberation Organization conducted a traditional statutory interpretation exercise in its application of
Charming Betsy. The court identified specific text that could be
differentially interpreted, and noted that the relevant statutory
section did not make any reference to abrogation of international obligations.10 7 The court then examined the entire legislative enactment, parts of which clearly did address treaty obligations, in contrast to the omission in the section dealing with
maintenance of offices. 108 The court then reviewed the legislative history of the statute, finding no clear expression of intent
to abrogate.1 0 9 Finally, the court noted that the judiciary has
been known to go to great "lengths... in construing domestic
statutes so as to avoid conflict with international agreements." 110 A similar analysis can be conducted in the AEDPAVCCR context.

for United Nations' invitees, such as the PLO, to operate an office at the
Headquarters. Id. at 20; see also Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. at
1458-59.
103. PalestineLiberation Org., 695 F. Supp. at 1465.
104. Id.
105. Id. (noting that the Charming Betsy canon "is a rule of statutory construction sustained by an unbroken line of authority for over a century and a
half").
106. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 66 (1804).
107. PalestineLiberation Org., 695 F. Supp. at 1469.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1469-70.
110. Id. at 1468.
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D. APPLYING CHARMING BETSYTO ALLOW REVIEW AND
RECONSIDERATION UNDER THE AEDPA
If the AEDPA is an ambiguous statute that is open to interpretation, then the Charming Betsy canon can be used to
avoid invocation of the last-in-time rule. If petitioners raising
VCCR claims for the first time in federal habeas proceedings
wish to avoid the result in Breard, they might begin by convincing the Supreme Court that there is no conflict between the
treaty and the statute. Giving the Supreme Court a permissible
route to hear defendants' cases without simply deferring outright to the international tribunal would seem to be the most
effective strategy for enforcement. The first hurdle for VCCR
litigants then, is to show that the AEDPA provisions are ambiguous.
Any statutory interpretation exercise begins with the
text.1 1 ' Examining the plain text of AEDPA section 2254, the
first argument for ambiguity is that the section makes no mention of treaties whatsoever. In addition, the Supreme Court it12
self recognized the section's ambiguity in Williams v.Taylor.1
The Court noted that the term "failed" in the statute is open to
varying interpretations. 113 As the Court stated, "'fail' connotes
some omission, fault, or negligence on the part of the person
who has failed to do something." 11 4 This seems a clear opening
for the Court to classify various omissions by petitioners differentially, either as failures or not. In Breard, the Court implied
that the state's initial treaty violation had, over time, become
the defendant's failure, but the opinion in Breard is hardly a
definitive interpretation of the AEDPA. The Breard decision
was issued without full argument or briefing, and was prior to
LaGrand and Avena. 115 One can argue that another possible interpretation of the statute does exist; that is all that Charming
16
Betsy requires. 1

111. "As in all cases involving statutory construction, 'our starting point
must be the language employed by Congress,' and we assume 'that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used."' Am.
Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (citing Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979)).
112. 529 U.S. 420, 431-39 (2000); see also supra note 72 for additional discussion of the Williams case.
113. Williams, 529 U.S. at 431.
114. Id.
115. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam).
116. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
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Second, litigants will need to show that interpretation of
the AEDPA in a way that denies VCCR defendants evidentiary
hearings raises a separation of powers problem. This task is
simplified by the ICJ's recent ruling in Avena. Under this ruling, the continued application of procedural default rules to
preclude evidentiary hearings on VCCR claims is a violation of
Article 36(2).117 If the Supreme Court persists in construing the
AEDPA as it did in Breard, it will be placing the United States
in clear violation of its treaty obligations, as determined by the
ICJ. By construing a statute in a manner that conflicts directly
with international law, the Court will be usurping Congress's
prerogative to abrogate treaties. 118 The Supreme Court itself
has recognized that the ICJ is "an international court with jurisdiction to interpret such [treaties]. ' 119 The ICJ ruling is,
therefore, a pronouncement that the Supreme Court will have
to deal with, as part of the body of international law.
Abrogation of treaty obligations is a legislative, and arguably executive, function. It seems absurd, for example, that the
courts should have the power to expose U.S. nationals detained
abroad to possible retaliatory violations of their consular rights,
where neither Congress nor the executive branch have acted to
abrogate the VCCR. 120 It is for this reason that the Charming
Betsy canon was developed in the first instance. 121 Charming
Betsy prevents the courts from subjecting the nation to international political consequences resulting from treaty abrogation.

117. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
119. Breard, 523 U.S. at 375. Jurisdiction over disputes relating to interpretation of the Vienna Convention was granted to the ICJ under the Optional
Protocol to the Vienna Convention concerning the Compulsory Settlement of
Disputes. See LEE, supra note 2 at 198-204. The United States in fact proposed the Optional Protocol. Id. In October 1969, the Senate unanimously approved the Vienna Convention along with the Optional Protocol granting jurisdiction over disputes to the ICJ. See 115 CONG. REC. 30,997 (1969). Thus,
the United States has expressly agreed that any other nation that is party to
the Optional Protocol can submit disputes about the Vienna Convention to the
ICJ for binding resolution.
120. See Paust, supra note 76, at 697 (writing that the Breard opinion
"should be revisited" because "[i]f followed even partly abroad, the opinion
could have serious consequences for U.S. nationals detained in foreign countries"); see also, Editorial, Foreignerson Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004,
at A24 (suggesting that the President should halt executions of any of the
Mexican nationals named in the ICJ case so as not to imperil Americans overseas).
121. See supranote 81 and accompanying text.
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E. CONGRESS DID NOT INTEND FOR THE AEDPA TO ABROGATE
TREATY OBLIGATIONS

One could argue that even if the AEDPA is open to alternative interpretations, Congress has clearly expressed its intent
to preclude judicial "review and reconsideration" of any facts
not developed at the state level. The habeas statute does, after
all, mention claims based on treaties. 122 This mention of treaties, however, is far from a clear statement that Congress intended to abrogate the duties of the United States under the
Vienna Convention, or any other treaty for that matter. This
language has been in the habeas statute since the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction was expanded to specifically include the
writ in 1867,123 and alone cannot serve as a basis for the contention that Congress meant to abrogate subsequently enacted
treaties such as the Vienna Convention. In addition, the legislative history of the AEDPA does not indicate that Congress
had treaty abrogation in mind at all, when writing revisions to
the habeas statute. Although there is much discussion of potential treaty obligations and violations in the legislative history
referring to the antiterrorism portions of the AEDPA, there is
no mention whatsoever of treaties in the portion of the legislative history specifically devoted to the Effective Death Penalty
Act. For example, in drafting the alien removal procedures under the AEDPA, Congress specifically addressed potential impairments to treaty obligations. 124 The conference committee
report for the AEDPA expresses Congress's intent not to abrogate treaties through removal of any alien. 125 The same report
makes no mention of treaties in relation to the Effective Death
Penalty portions of the bill.126 Similarly, a key House Report
from the previous year, which introduced the Effective Death
Penalty Act as a separate bill, made no mention of treaty obli122. See supra note 71 for the text of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2000) (allowing
the courts to "entertain an application for writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
person in custody on the grounds that he is in custody in violation of the Con-

stitution or law or treaties of the United States").
123.

Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 2, 14 Stat. 385, 385-86, cited in RANDY

HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN,

1 FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 2.4(d) (2001).
124. See H.R. REP. 104-518 at 54-55 (1996).
125. Id. (stating that "the removal of an alien shall be to any country which
the alien shall designate if such designation does not, in the opinion of the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, impair the obligation of the United States under any treaty").
126. See id. at 101-07.
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gations, or of abrogation anywhere. 127 At a minimum, Congress's silence on the issue of treaties creates ambiguity, because courts will not construe a statute to abrogate international law, in the absence of a clear statement of legislative
intent. 128 Congress's silence in this area hardly qualifies as a
clear statement. It is simply impossible to glean any congressional intent to abrogate treaty obligations from the statutory
language of the AEDPA. As a result, the CharmingBetsy canon
should be applied in place of the last-in-time canon of statutory
interpretation.
IV. APPLYING THE LOGIC OF CHARMING BETSY TO
ADDRESS PROCEDURAL DEFAULT RESTRICTIONS ON
"REVIEW AND RECONSIDERATION"
As discussed earlier, habeas corpus petitioners may confront two obstacles to the review and reconsideration mandated
in Avena-the AEDPA restriction on evidentiary hearings and
procedural default. While the two doctrines are linked, and the
Court has adopted the same cause and prejudice standard for a
defendant to overcome each, 129 they should be addressed separately. The Charming Betsy canon most clearly applies in the
statutory context, but its shadow should fall equally across the
judge-made doctrine of procedural default.
In describing the procedural default doctrine in Breard,the
Supreme Court stated "[i]t is the rule in this country that assertions of error in criminal proceedings must first be raised in
130
state court in order to form the basis for relief in habeas."'
Indeed the Court was correct in its assertion that it was applying a rule, not a constitutional provision or even a statute, to
refuse to give Breard admission to the federal habeas process.
The doctrine of procedural default is judge-made, not congressionally mandated, and has been far from consistent over time.

127.

See id.; see also H.R. REP. 104-23, at 9 (1995) (describing the bill as

"designed to reduce the abuse of habeas corpus that results from delayed and
repetitive filings").
128. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
129. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 433 (2000) (stating that the "[clourt
borrowed the cause and prejudice standard applied to procedurally defaulted

claims, deciding that there was no reason 'to distinguish between failing to
properly assert a federal claim in state court and failing in state court to properly develop such a claim"') (citation omitted).
130. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (citing Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1997)).
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Initially, the procedural default doctrine applied only if the
petitioner had "deliberately bypassed" state courts before bringing claims to federal court. 131 Over the decades, however, the
doctrine has become increasingly restrictive, barring federal
courts from even entertaining claims, never mind holding evidentiary hearings, where defendants and their attorneys have
deliberately or inadvertently failed to follow state procedural
rules. 132
Petitioners who have been subject to a Vienna Convention
violation can argue that the procedural default rules should not
apply, based on the ICJ's own statement on the matter:
the procedural default rule has not been revised nor has any provision
been made to prevent its application in cases where it has been the
failure of the United States itself to inform that may have precluded
counsel from being in a position to have raised the question of a viola133
tion of the [VCCRI in the initial trial.

Defendants can overcome procedural default by showing
cause and prejudice, 134 and can certainly argue that state failures to provide consular notification constitute cause. In
Murray v. Carrier,the analogue to its AEDPA ruling in Williams, the Supreme Court noted that procedural default would
not apply where some "objective factor external to the defense
impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural
rule."' 3 5 The holding in Murray supports the notion that where
state actors interfere with defense counsel's ability to comply
with state procedural rules by not advising defendants of their
VCCR rights, the defendant cannot be held to have defaulted.
Petitioners may also want to use the separation of powers
logic behind Charming Betsy, even though the canon usually
applies only to interpretation of statutes. In Charming Betsy,
the Court developed, and has reasserted for the last century, a
doctrine preventing the judiciary from impinging on the other
branches' exclusive right to abrogate treaties. If interpretation

131.

Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).

See generally HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 67, § 26.
133. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128
132.

(Mar. 31).

134.

Id.; see also Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany

4.34

(Sept. 16, 1999), LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 465 (June 27) (describing the combination of procedural bar rules and the AEDPA as making "it
even more difficult to challenge a state conviction. A habeas petitioner alleging
to be held in violation of treaty law will not even be granted an evidentiary
hearing to establish prejudice.")
135. 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
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of a statute in a manner than violates treaty obligations is a
severe violation of the separation of powers severe enough to
warrant its own canon of construction, the use of judicially created procedural doctrines to accomplish the same result surely
is more severe. Petitioners using this logic, however, will be pitting the separation of powers doctrine against procedural default's grounding in federalism. International law, as codified
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, is clear that federalism is no excuse for breach of treaty commitments. 136 Charming Betsy offers courts a means by which to cloak deference to
international law in domestic separation of powers doctrine.
Whether the Supreme Court would choose such a trope remains
to be seen.
CONCLUSION
With its judgment in Avena, the ICJ has set sail on a collision course with the American courts. By finding that state
failures to notify defendants of their Article 36 rights constitutes a breach of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
and by finding further that failure by courts to review and reconsider those individual cases based on procedural default the
AEDPA constitutes a separate and ongoing violation, the ICJ
has presented the Supreme Court with a clear choice. The
Court can either flout international law, intentionally placing
the United States in clear breach of that law, or the Court can
patch together some method of judicial review and reconsideration of pending capital cases. The Court likely will be confronted with the issue soon, in the case of Jos6 Medellin. While
the Court may indeed be willing to flout international law
when it comes to the death penalty, it would at the same time
flout separation of powers doctrine, which reserves to the political branches the power to abrogate treaties. The Court has
confronted this problem in the past and developed a canon of
construction that tips the balance to preserving separation of
powers, as well as preserving relations with other nations.
While the ICJ's and the Supreme Court's doctrinal ships indeed
seem headed for disaster, an ancient schooner by the name of
The CharmingBetsy may sail into the fray and bring a change
of course.

136.

See Swaine, supra note 42, at 450.

